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Berkeley is famous for his immaterialism and for his idealism. Let us define 
immaterialism as the denial that there is anything answering to the name ‘matter,’ and 
idealism as the view that, at bottom, everything that exists is either a mind or perceived by a 
mind. These are somewhat unorthodox definitions, in part because they separate two ideas 
that are sometimes blended together. A recent book on Berkeley defines immaterialism as, 
‘the view that only minds and ideas exist; there is no such thing as matter’ (Dicker 2011, 3).1 
But it is important, I think, to keep these views separate. What counts as an argument that 
there is no such thing as matter does not show anything with regard to whether everything is 
a mind (or in a mind), or even whether anything is a mind (or in a mind). This distinction 
is also useful for the present discussion, since Berkeley is also famous for claiming to be a 
philosopher of common sense, and he arguably regards the question of whether 
immaterialism is commonsensical differently from the question of whether idealism is.2 
In Principles §4, Berkeley says that the belief ‘that houses, mountains, rivers, and in 
a word all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being 
perceived by the understanding,’—a belief that conflicts with idealism but not necessarily 
with immaterialism—is ‘strangely prevailing.’ Here, ‘strangely’ means just ‘very much,’ not 
‘oddly’ (see Winkler 1989, 5). So, Berkeley here notes that the anti-idealist view is also the 
more popular view. If being common is part of being commonsensical, then Berkeley 
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seems self-aware that his idealism is not straightforwardly commonsensical. Still, Berkeley 
does seem to regard his philosophy as somehow friendly to—even perhaps a philosophical 
defense of—common sense. Yet if his idealism is not the commonsensical part of his 
system, it seems even stranger that Berkeley would think his immaterialism is the touching 
point between his philosophy and the views of that ‘illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the 
high-road of plain, common sense’ (PI §1).  
How Berkeley thought his views were friendly to common sense has intrigued 
scholars for years. What philosophical benefit is there in claiming to side with common 
sense? Did he completely misunderstand the views of the ‘common run of mankind’ or 
not realize how unusual the denial of the existence of matter would sound to them? Or did 
he actually disregard common opinions and only cynically claim the title of ‘common 
sense’ for the views he thought defensible?  
At the outset, it is worth noting that there is no consensus on how Berkeley’s 
philosophy and common sense are supposed to be related. Some think Berkeley’s 
philosophy just is common sense itself and so in offering arguments for his philosophy 
Berkeley offers arguments for common sense (Luce 1967, 82). Many scholars think 
Berkeley regarded his philosophy as a defense of common sense, that he was offering 
arguments that supported common sense views or showed in what way common sense is 
correct (see, e.g., Muehlmann 1992, and Stoneham 2002). On this interpretation, Berkeley 
is an apologist for common sense. Others think that Berkeley’s project was more modest. 
George Pappas, for instance, sees Berkeley as claiming only that his philosophy is 
consistent with common sense, though to a greater degree than the views of his materialist 
opponents (see Pappas 2000). There are other interpretations as well. In this chapter, we 
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will survey the range of positions that scholars have defended on the relationship between 
Berkeley’s philosophy and common sense, beginning with the view that Berkeley’s 
apparent respect for common sense was at best disingenuous.  
 
Dismissive Accounts 
 Berkeley advertises his Three Dialogues as an attempt to combat skepticism and 
atheism, and to ‘reduce men from paradoxes to common sense’ (3D 2:168).3 Yet, 
Berkeley’s philosophy is so odd that it’s natural to wonder whether he could have been 
serious to think he was in any way defending, vindicating, or corroborating common sense. 
There are some reasons to think that Berkeley was disingenuous. For one thing, he seems 
to distinguish his views from common sense more so in his private correspondence than in 
his published works. He tells his friend Percival that, ‘whatever doctrine contradicts vulgar 
and settled opinion had need been introduced with great caution into the world. For this 
reason it was I omitted all mention of the non-existence of matter in the title-page, 
dedication, preface, and introduction, that so the notion might steal unawares on the 
reader, who possibly would never have meddled with a book that he had known contained 
such paradoxes’ (Works 8:36, emphasis added).4 Even in his published works there are 
hints that Berkeley recognized there was friction between his views and common sense. In 
the preface to his Principles, for example, he notes his views are ‘contrary to the prejudices 
of mankind’ (Preface to Principles, 2:23). 
Admissions such as these provide ample ground for those, like Jonathan Bennett, 
who read Berkeley’s friendly claims about common sense as thinly veiled rhetorical 
window-dressing (see also Yandell 1995). Bennett thinks Berkeley’s idealist treatment of 
UNPUBLISHED DRAFT: DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE W/O PERMISSION 4 
ordinary objects—his claim that such objects are collections of ideas—is ‘casually dismissive’ 
and ‘disrespectful’ of commonsensical beliefs. Bennett writes, ‘Berkeley does not endorse 
the plain person’s belief in sensible things—he condescends to it’ (Bennett 2001, 176-177). 
 That is perhaps too easy a verdict to reach. For one thing, there are more passages 
where Berkeley seems to place his philosophy on the side of common sense than those 
where he notes a conflict. These cannot be ignored, even if one thinks there is a strain of 
cynicism in his writing.  
More importantly, Berkeley’s metaphysics is intimately tied to—perhaps even 
derived directly from—his epistemology. That epistemology provides a theoretical 
framework through which ordinary ways of speaking and belief ascriptions are to be 
understood. Bennett seems to think that what the plain person says is more or less a 
straightforward guide to what they believe. But for Berkeley, ordinary language claims and 
belief ascriptions have to be analyzed into their constituent ideas to understand what they 
really mean. To learn from what a plain person believes on the basis of what they say 
requires first recasting those statements in terms of his epistemology and philosophy of 
language. That recasting would show that what people say is different from what they mean 
or believe. One cannot simply note that the vulgar say they believe that sensible objects 
exist independently of minds and conclude that common sense includes the proposition 
‘sensible objects exist independently of minds.’ Rather, we must first ask what is meant—
that is, what ideas are signified—by someone who says they believe sensible objects exist 
independently of minds.5 Of course, it is Berkeley’s view that the mind-independence of 
sensible objects is inconceivable; this is the intended result of the so-called Master 
Argument of both the Principles and the Dialogues (see P §§22-24 and 3D 2:200). So, 
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there is no coherent idea for anyone uttering such words to signify. Therefore, no one can 
either mean or believe that sensible objects exist independently of minds, though of course 
one can say it.6 For Bennett then to claim that Berkeley is dismissive of common sense 
attitudes about sensible objects begs the question against Berkeley’s epistemology and the 
consequences it has for understanding ordinary language, and inter alia, common sense. In 
short, the beliefs Bennett claims are part of common sense, on Berkeley’s view, may not be 
beliefs one could consistently hold in the first place.  
 Dismissive interpretations such as Bennett’s are in the minority among Berkeley 
scholars. There is a fair consensus that Berkeley was at least some of the time interested in 
showing a fit between his philosophy and (some understanding of) common sense. The 
textual evidence counts strongly in favor of such readings. The most oft-quoted text is 
Berkeley’s remark in the Notebooks that, ‘I side in all things with the Mob,’ which is 
shortly followed by his self-reminder to be careful in explaining what, in his view, is meant 
by claims of sensible objects existing when unperceived, so as to ‘shew how the Vulgar 
notion agrees with mine’ (NB 405 & 407). And while the Preface to the Principles suggests 
a Berkeley self-conscious about the ‘novelty and singularity’ of his views, the Preface to the 
Three Dialogues—explicitly intended to be a more accessible version of the material from 
the Principles—is thoroughly populist. There, it is not Berkeley’s views but ‘the prejudices 
of philosophers which have so far prevailed against the common sense and natural notions 
of mankind’ (3D 2:167-168). Berkeley’s advertised project is to introduce new principles 
he thinks will undermine skepticism and atheism and see ‘men reduced from paradoxes to 
common sense’ (Ibid). The bulk of the Three Dialogues is about determining whether 
Hylas’ materialism or Philonous’ immaterialism is ‘most agreeable to common sense, and 
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remote from skepticism’ (3D 2:172). When all is said and done, Berkeley (through 
Philonous) claims to have united and placed in a clearer light ‘that truth, which was before 
shared between the vulgar and the philosophers: the former being of the opinion, that 
those things they immediately perceive are the real things; and the latter, that the things 
immediately perceived, are ideas which exist only in the mind. Which two notions put 
together, do in effect constitute the substance of what I advance’ (3D 2:262, original 
emphasis).  
If, in the Three Dialogues Berkeley is not genuine in claiming that his views are 
closer to common sense than materialism, then he is an exceedingly artful deceiver. Yet 
accepting that Berkeley is serious about the close relationship between his philosophy and 
common sense does little to answer just what he thinks that relationship is, or how close he 
thinks it to be.  
  
What does Berkeley mean by ‘common sense’? 
 Bennett’s conclusion that Berkeley is dismissive of common sense rests on an 
assumption about the nature of common sense: that common sense is readily understood 
independently of philosophy. He also thinks Berkeley shares this understanding. This is 
not (pardon the pun) an uncommon kind of assumption to make. One might think that if 
anything can be discussed ‘pre-philosophically,’ surely it is common sense. And, since 
Berkeley nowhere says in great detail what exactly he means by common sense, it is 
tempting to think he didn’t say more because he thought it would have been obvious to his 
readers. As a result of his saying so little, scholars have had much to say about what 
Berkeley counts as common sense. The variety of views falls into roughly three types. 
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Proposit ional Accounts 
 The most prevalent kind of interpretation takes common sense to be a set or family 
of propositions that are commonly held, philosophically basic, or perhaps just obviously 
true. Typically, Berkeley’s philosophy is judged to be commonsensical according to how 
many common sense propositions it either entails or is consistent with. But just which 
propositions are counted as commonsensical, and of those, which ones Berkeley’s 
philosophy is supposed to support, are up for debate.  
 According to David Berman, it is the common sense view that physical objects have 
causal power that makes Berkeley’s claim that only agents can be causes ‘embarrassingly 
uncommonsensical’ (Berman 1994, 41; see also Ibid., 42). Margaret Atherton says, 
‘common sense clearly supposes that we don’t have to do anything to perceive physical 
objects’ and that when we see, ‘we see what’s out there’ (Atherton 2008, 109; see also 
Atherton 1990, 209). George Pitcher thinks it is common sense that we see and feel the 
very same objects (Pitcher 1977, 59-61). Bennett thinks that it is part of common sense that 
physical objects ‘can be perceived by you and by me, yesterday and tomorrow, by sight and 
by touch’ (Bennett 2001, 170). George Pappas presents a detailed list of propositions he 
thinks are most fundamental to common sense and is equally detailed in showing which of 
these Berkeley accepts and defends (Pappas 2000, 217). 
 Propositional accounts are the most common type because Berkeley’s texts are 
riddled with suggestive remarks deriding his opponents’ views as being contrary to common 
sense. There are even occasional positive remarks that appear to endorse one view or 
another as being in accord with common sense. This can be taken to mean both that (a) 
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Berkeley thought of common sense as containing definite propositions, and (b) the 
contraries of the views he criticizes are either Berkeley’s views or common sense views (or 
both). Pappas, for example, takes Berkeley’s critical comments about the 
uncommonsensical nature of materialism to be indicative of his views about common sense 
itself (see Pappas 2000, 218 ff.).  
 As tempting as this approach may be, it is fraught with difficulty. For starters, as we 
have already seen, Berkeley’s claims about his philosophy’s relationship to common sense 
are not univocally positive. It is hard to distill from his scattered remarks anything more 
than an uneven affinity with common sense. Also, Berkeley’s positive views are not always 
clear. So, noting that he rejects one view is not necessarily an indication that Berkeley 
accepted a particular rival view, let alone whether either view is considered by Berkeley to 
be part of common sense. Partly, this is due to Berkeley’s insistence that many materialist 
claims are meaningless, not simply false. A meaningless claim has no contrary, so 
Berkeley’s rejection of such a claim cannot automatically tell us what claim he does accept. 
The biggest difficulty with a propositional account of common sense is in giving an 
answer to the question of why Berkeley cares to defend such a conception of common 
sense. Even a careful accounting of all the passages where Berkeley mentions common 
sense does not generate anything more than a hodgepodge of propositions with little 
connection to each other. There is no principle that appears to unify the allegedly 
commonsensical propositions into a coherent body of common sense knowledge.7 Absent 
such a principle, it is a vexing question why Berkeley cares at all about showing his 
philosophy is consistent with—let alone a defense of—a cluster of unrelated propositions, 
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why he defends some commonsensical propositions and not others, or why he thinks doing 
so is any mark in favor of his philosophy.8  
 
The Perspectival Approach 
 Where propositional accounts of Berkeley’s view of common sense fail is in 
explaining what the various commonsensical propositions have in common and why 
Berkeley cares to show his philosophy is either consistent with them or a defense of them. 
One way to provide both is to understand common sense more holistically, as a worldview 
or perspective that might make better sense of Berkeley’s apparent sympathy. This is the 
approach John Russell Roberts has defended. Borrowing a Sellarsian notion of an image of 
humanity-in-the-world—a conceptual framework through which the world and humanity’s 
place in it are understood—Roberts argues that Berkeley’s conception of common sense 
can be understood as a religious image. The religious image conceives of the world first 
and foremost as a creation of a supreme God, and human beings are conceived as specially 
made in the image of that God as well as given a special place in the world. The core of the 
religious image is monotheism. Roberts’ interpretation then takes Berkeley’s claims 
regarding common sense to be claims about the religious image. Berkeley’s philosophy, 
according to Roberts, is, if not common sense itself, at least friendly to it since common 
sense is, after all, nothing but monotheism.9 
 If Berkeley understood common sense as something like the holistic, conceptual 
scheme of the religious image, then it should be clear both how Berkeley thought he was 
offering a defense of common sense and why he thought it might be worth defending. 
Berkeley does say that one of the principal dangers of materialism is the possibility that it 
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would lead people to skepticism and atheism, ‘to entertain suspicions concerning the most 
important truths which they had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable’ (3D 2:172). So 
presenting a metaphysics that places an active personal God at its center is conducive to 
both projects.  
Explaining Berkeley’s motivation and his sense of having succeeded in defending 
(this view of) common sense is not a problem for a perspectival approach such as Roberts’. 
The real problem is much simpler: there is no textual evidence to support it. Of course, 
Berkeley is a monotheist and his motivation for advancing a monotheistic metaphysics is 
transparent. But there is no indication in Berkeley’s texts that he thought of his 
monotheism as central to common sense. Indeed, all of Berkeley’s major philosophical 
opponents, the same people whose views he considers dangerously opposed to common 
sense, are monotheists as well. When Berkeley talks about common sense, his major 
concern is with the dangers posed to it by materialism, not polytheism, pantheism, or 
atheism. Recall, Berkeley’s worry is that materialism leads to atheism, not the other way 
around. So the strange truth, as I suggested at the opening, seems to be that Berkeley 
thought of his immaterialism—not his theism—as the main point of contact between his 
philosophy and the untutored common sense of the vulgar. The religious image is very 
probably an image that Berkeley would have shared, but it is a stretch to think that 
Berkeley identified it with common sense itself. 
 
Alternative Strategies 
Shared in common by the accounts discussed above is an assumption that 
Berkeley’s intention was to offer a philosophical apology for common sense, or at least to 
UNPUBLISHED DRAFT: DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE W/O PERMISSION 11 
provide it with some additional philosophical support by showing that common sense is 
consistent with strict philosophy. The idea shared by nearly all commentators is that 
Berkeley meant to defend common sense in a positive, constructive manner by offering 
arguments for propositions or perspectives that he thought were philosophically sound and 
commonsensical at the same time. This assumption raises a number of difficult questions, 
as I’ve already mentioned. Why does Berkeley think common sense is worth defending in 
this way? Why does he single out only some apparently commonsensical views for defense 
and criticize others? If the views being defended really are just a matter of common sense, 
why would Berkeley feel compelled to offer additional philosophical support in the first 
place? And, most pressing, how could Berkeley be so apparently clueless that his 
philosophy is so far from what most would say is common sense? 
If we reject the assumption that Berkeley was arguing for common sense, however, 
these questions lose their force. And we should reject this assumption. Indeed, Berkeley 
nowhere says that he aims to ‘defend’ common sense; he says that he aims to vindicate it 
(3D 2: 244). So another view is that Berkeley’s strategy was not to defend common sense 
by arguing for it, but to protect common sense by arguing against views he regarded as 
threats to it— i.e., to vindicate common sense.10 On this view the core of common sense 
consists simply—but not merely, for the implications are significant—in the belief that the 
immediately perceived world is the real world.   
We can read Berkeley as being fully aware that his own views were not part and 
parcel of common sense; that few among the vulgar would ever consider, let alone agree, 
that the sensible world depends for its existence on its being perceived, or that we do not 
touch the very same thing we see, and so on. But this does not mean that he could not 
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reasonably regard his philosophy as being salutary to the ‘illiterate bulk of mankind who 
walk the high-road of plain, common sense.’ The reason why is stated clearly in both the 
introduction to the Principles and in the preface to Three Dialogues: philosophy is 
supposed to lead to greater clarity and wisdom, yet in practice it leads its practitioners into 
‘uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies.’ The result is that philosophers who 
are supposed to know as much as anyone can are drawn insensibly to skepticism. This 
skepticism among philosophers is dangerous to people of common sense because, ‘when 
men of less leisure see them who are supposed to have spent their whole time in the 
pursuits of knowledge, professing an entire ignorance of all things, or advancing such 
notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly received principles, they will be tempted 
to entertain suspicions concerning the most important truths, which they had hitherto held 
sacred and unquestionable’ (3D 2:172).  
These sacred and unquestionable truths are those of religion. There is then a 
connection between Berkeley’s views about common sense and his religious commitments, 
but it is not exactly the one Roberts has highlighted. What Berkeley seems to be saying is 
not that theism is a part of common sense, but that skeptical philosophy can have a 
disrupting effect on the common sense, religion-friendly credulity of the non-philosopher. 
The vulgar are ‘for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that’s familiar 
appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want in their 
senses, and are out of all danger of becoming skeptics’ (PI §1).  
This credulity is useful for the ends of religion, and as a bishop, Berkeley has a 
clear motivation to preserve this. So, the question as to why Berkeley would care about 
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defending—or rather, vindicating—common sense is easily answered: common sense, 
considered as the default, credulous state of the vulgar, is useful for ecclesiastical purposes.  
It is also easy to identify the dangerous philosophical views most centrally in 
Berkeley’s sights, especially given how Berkeley defines ‘skeptic.’ A skeptic is one who 
‘denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance of them’ (3D 
2:173). We might put the point more pointedly: a skeptic denies that sensible things—the 
things perceived immediately by sense—are real. Of course, Berkeley is adamant that the 
only things perceived by sense, strictly speaking, are those immediate objects of sense: ideas 
of light and color (by sight), or of heat and cold, motion and resistance (by touch) (see P 
§§38 & 54, 3D 2:188 and 2:236). These ideas are nothing but what they are perceived to 
be and have no being in themselves outside of the mind.  On these points, Berkeley would 
have met with little resistance, even from Locke himself. The crucial and dangerous move 
that Locke and others make is in supposing that something beyond our ideas—something 
more real yet less evident—is perceived indirectly by the senses. This is matter, material 
substance, or substratum; or as Berkeley understands it, an ‘inert, senseless unknown 
substance’ that ‘neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived’ (P §68). But with the 
supposition of matter, the ‘real’ things are the material objects that one supposes to be the 
causes of our immediately perceived ideas; the ideas themselves, the things immediately 
perceived by sense, are reduced to a false imaginary glare. 
On Berkeley’s view, materialism directly implies skepticism about the reality of 
sensible things, and skepticism leads to atheism and irreligion. So it is Berkeley’s 
immaterialism—his case against the existence of matter and the attending belief that the 
sensed world is not the real world—that is the lynchpin of his vindication of common sense. 
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As a negative metaphysical thesis, there is little Berkeley can offer by way of positive 
arguments for immaterialism which explains why Berkeley’s case consists primarily in 
drawing out the absurd consequences—metaphysical, epistemological and semantic—of the 
materialist hypothesis. That is enough for Berkeley’s purposes. The reason why is again 
suggested by Berkeley himself: the vulgar are naturally disposed to accept that the things 
they perceive are the real things and not merely appearances caused in our minds by some 
unperceived somethings-we-know-not-what. This natural credulity is the default state of 
mind for anyone not in the grips of skeptical philosophy; this is what Berkeley means by 
common sense. And he means to vindicate it by warding off the major threat to it: by 
offering arguments against materialism and, in the process, skepticism and atheism.  
That Berkeley thought of common sense as this default naïve realism is, I think, 
nicely shown by his closing remarks in the Three Dialogues. 
PHILONOUS: I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours 
tend only to unite and place in a clearer light that truth, which was before shared 
between the vulgar and the philosophers: the former being of opinion, that those 
things they immediately perceive are the real things; and the latter, that the things 
immediately perceived, are ideas which exist only in the mind. Which two notions 
put together, do in effect constitute the substance of what I advance. (3D 2:262) 
By understanding Berkeley’s defense of common sense as this negative, vindicatory project, 
we can better understand why he was so ambivalent towards other commonly held beliefs 
and those of the vulgar more generally. The ‘illiterate bulk of mankind’ is unlearned, and 
quite naturally, one would expect to find more superstition and old wives tales in 
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commonly held beliefs than deep philosophical truth. Yet even the vulgar have sense 
enough to trust in their senses that fire is hot and sugar sweet. 
 This alternative account can also show how Berkeley could have simultaneously 
thought of his own philosophy as contrary to common opinions and yet also useful in the 
service of common sense. Since the vulgar’s naïve realism is the default position, it needn’t 
be argued for, it needs only to be left undisturbed. Nor are the vulgar his audience; 
skeptically-minded philosophers are. So it would not much matter to Berkeley whether the 
vulgar would find his philosophy perfectly obvious or downright loony if, as is unlikely, they 
were ever confronted with it. What matters from Berkeley’s perspective, rather, is whether 
or not those in a position of intellectual authority are setting the right example: whether 
they believe that we can know, directly and immediately, that the objects of sense are red, 
round, sweet, or hot, or whether they profess that the real world is fundamentally 
unknowable. Berkeley, along with the vulgar, holds the former. 
 
                                                
1 One might doubt whether the clause following the semicolon is intended to explicate the 
preceding clause. However, Dicker later explicitly conflates the two views: ‘Berkeley’s 
position is also called ‘idealism,’ and I shall use that term more frequently than 
‘immaterialism.’’ Ibid. p. 4. 
2 For Berkeley’s professions of affinity for common sense, see especially the Preface to the 
Dialogues. For alternative definitions of idealism, see Muehlmann (1992) p. 13.  
3 Berkeley also claims here that the Dialogues are meant simply ‘to treat more clearly and 
fully of certain principles’ introduced in his Principles of Human Knowledge, ‘and to place 
them in a new light.’ A natural reading of this is that Berkeley thought of the Principles as 
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equally friendly to common sense despite how little he says about common sense in that 
work. Though, one might contend that the connection to common sense that Berkeley 
draws in the Dialogues just is the ‘new light’ he mentions.   
4 Berkeley used the term ‘vulgar’ typically to refer to uneducated people and their opinions. 
Because the vast majority of the population in Berkeley’s day fit this description, it is a fair 
inference that where he speaks of ‘the vulgar’ and ‘vulgar opinions’ he is speaking of 
common folk and common sense opinions.  
5 There is some debate on this point, but most scholars agree that Berkeley held some kind 
of ideational theory of meaning on which language gains its meaning from ideas perceived 
and signified by the speaker. To my knowledge, only John Russell Roberts denies that 
Berkeley holds any kind of ideational theory of meaning. See his (2007), especially chapter 
2. For a more mainstream account of Berkeley’s theory of meaning, see Winkler’s (1989) 
chapter 1 and (2005). 
6 Berkeley himself vacillates between calling such utterances meaningless or contradictory, 
but the upshot is the same in either case. Someone who claims, ‘I believe that sensible 
objects exist independently of minds’ certainly does not take her claim to be either 
meaningless or contradictory. On Berkeley’s view, however, this is only because the 
speaker does not carefully attend to the ideas she signifies (or rather her failure to signify 
any ideas) when speaking. So recognizing what people might commonly say does not 
require Berkeley to grant that anything in particular is meant or believed as part of 
common sense. 
7 This is not to say that a reconstructive propositional account of what Berkeley means by 
common sense couldn’t provide a unifying principle or an answer to the question of why 
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Berkeley cares about common sense in the first place. There might be such a connecting 
principle that scholars have overlooked. My point here is just that the propositional 
accounts on offer have as yet failed to show convincingly what it is about common sense—
considered as a collection of commonsensical propositions—that Berkeley finds valuable. 
8 Pappas at least is aware of this challenge and tries to meet it, I would argue unsuccessfully. 
See Bordner (2011) 331-333 for a critique of Pappas’ attempt at answering these questions. 
9 See Roberts (2007) 142: “Berkeley is only interested in defending his view as common 
sense insofar as a commitment to a traditional Judeo-Christian monotheism is considered 
a part of common sense.” 
10 I defend this account in full in Bordner (2011). 
